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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Religious Teachers of Greece. By JAMES ADAM. Edited with a memoir by his wife, ADELA MARIAN ADAM. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark ; New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. lv, 467.

Dr. Adam, well known to scholars by his critical and exegetical edition of the *Republic*, died while engaged in preparing for the press these lectures, which are edited with a memoir by his wife. He himself, with characteristic candor and modesty, said that he had no illusions as to their scientific value. The implied judgment is true only in the sense in which it would apply to almost any general survey of the religious aspect of Greek literature in the present state of our knowledge. The 'science' of Greek myth and cult is still in the making, and must rest on many monographs yet to be written. Meanwhile, no essay based on the literary sources alone can be expected to add much to our knowledge or to suggest startlingly novel points of view. The field has been repeatedly worked over, the significant and classical passages have all been excerpted and quoted again and again, the true and obvious generalizations have all been made, the apt parallels drawn, the illuminating comparisons suggested.

Dr. Adam's theme, topics, and chapters are in the main those of Professor Campbell's *Religion in Greek Literature*, also originally prepared as Gifford Lectures. The differences are due chiefly to the fact that Campbell is on the whole the more brilliant and suggestive writer, Adam the more cautious and painstaking student ; that Campbell permits himself more excursions into the outlying domains of comparative mythology and religion ; and lastly, of course, that there are some topics in which the one, some in which the other scholar is by his previous studies more at home. For Campbell's preliminary chapters on "Antecedents and Survivals" and the associated problems of folk-lore and anthropology, Adam substitutes a disquisition, suggested by his Platonic studies, on the "Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry in Greek Literature." Each gives fifty or sixty pages to Homer. Campbell devotes separate chapters to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, glances now and again at the Homeric question, and in his desultory, unsystematic exposition lets fall a number of interesting observations of detail noted in his own reading or borrowed from the Germans. Adam omits all reference to the Homeric problem, and, ignoring the

alleged differences between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* on the ground that they were not felt by the Greeks themselves, proceeds directly to the discussion of the Homeric ideas of God, worship, prayer, sacrifice, sin, and the life to come. He dwells especially on the familiar opposition between Homer's general anthropomorphism and the germs of a higher monotheism contained in the religion of Zeus, and on the gloominess of Homer's picture of the future life. In compensation for this insistence on what he terms the darker side of the Homeric religion, he touches lightly on what is for us, though he does not venture to say so, the real religion of Homer, — his idealization of man. A certain temperamental sympathy with mystic and sentimental expansion (strangely contrasting with the sobriety of Adam's scholarship) which manifests itself throughout the volume, especially in the treatment of Orphism and Plato, may be noted already in this chapter in the slight exaggeration of the naïvete and childlike quality of Homer's "faith." Adam altogether overlooks the element of Ionian irony and scepticism so brilliantly brought out in Professor Murray's *Rise of the Greek Epic*.

The perfunctory fourth chapter, "From Hesiod to Bacchylides," is merely a bridge to carry us across the Greek middle ages to the more attractive world of Pindar and the Orphics. It contains an error that renews my perpetual amazement at the mistakes of interpretation committed by European scholars who accomplish labors of erudition and display a virtuosity in verse composition that seems incredible to our less robust scholarship. Hesiod speaks of the men of the golden age as living an *πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁμοῖοι*, that is, remaining ever the same with vigor of limb unimpaired (in hands and feet). Adam actually translates this "with hands like feet and feet like hands," and suggests that the "obscure words" may be illuminated by the androgynous men of Plato's *Symposium* who rolled about the earth on eight limbs, four hands and four feet (p. 76).

The chapter on Orphism compares favorably with Campbell's treatment of the same theme, and has the advantage of having been written ten years later. It is a convenient résumé of the investigations of Rohde, Dieterich, Gruppe, Abel, Maass, Miss Harrison, and others. I have no criticism to offer except in matters of opinion. Without going so far as Mr. Alfred Benn, who sees in Orphism only a recrudescence of superstition and the "poisonous breath of reaction," I do not share Dr. Adam's sympathy with the mystical side of Greek philosophy and religion. Plato as a universal literary artist made use of Orphic imagery and coloring when the mood was upon him. But his serious thought was little affected by it.

On the well-worn themes of Pindar and the dramatists, Adam writes pleasantly but with no special originality. Quite enough is said of Pindar as the first poet to proclaim a moral judgment in the world to come; perhaps not enough of the essential conventionality and commonplaceness of his ethics. Accepting the received view that Æschylus, in the *Agamemnon* at least, protests against the crude Herodotean conception of the divine jealousy, Adam tries to show that Pindar too in the Seventh Isthmian Ode reinterprets in a higher sense the popular idea of *φθόνος*, and makes the envy of the gods apply only to unrighteous success. But there is no hint of explicit or conscious protest in Pindar's language, and the popular idea itself does not exclude the thought that it is the prosperity of the wicked that more especially provokes the divine jealousy.

The solution proposed for "the riddle of the *Bacchæ*" is that Dionysus in the poet's intention is not a personal god, but a symbol of the spirit of enthusiasm. The play, then, is not precisely a recantation of rationalism in favor of popular orthodoxy, but it is a tardy recognition by Euripides of what Professor James calls "this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of espousal," — in short, "the will to believe."

In the survey of the Pre-Socratics, we need only note that this same temper reads too much meaning into the poetical and pantheistic epigrams of Heraclitus.

To Socrates and Plato, with whom the book closes, Adam gives much more space than Campbell, and treats of some topics, *e. g.*, Plato's theory of education, whose connection with the main theme is but slight.

Of Socrates we really know little except the fact of his enormous influence and his dæmonic personality. Cautious critics will speak only of the Platonic or the Xenophontic Socrates. Adam, however, not only accepts the *Memorabilia* as a record of actual conversations, but believes that we may safely attribute to Socrates the special form in which Xenophon casts the argument from design. He is therefore able to construct for Socrates a theology which, not accepting his critical premises, I need not discuss.

The last hundred pages of the book on the religious teaching of Plato conform to convention in approaching Plato's religion from the side of metaphysics. But it is quite impossible to present Plato's religion in its true perspective from this point of view. One might as well treat the religion of Schleiermacher, Jowett, or Matthew Arnold as a system of metaphysics. The Platonic religion is ethical, social, contro-

versial, poetic, mystical, anything except metaphysical and theological. In some thinkers, metaphysics and theology coalesce, and the metaphysics originates in the theology or as *ancilla theologiæ* ministers to it. In others, metaphysics grows out of a serious attempt to grapple with the ultimates of logic, psychology, and cosmogony, and theological language is merely the expression of ethical and poetical feeling, or, at the most, of an intense distaste for crude and dogmatic materialism. The lines, of course, are not drawn with absolute rigidity. And thinkers of the second category may sometimes attempt to harmonize the two tendencies by symbolism and allegory.

But the fundamental distinction abides, and Plato is rightly understood only when we have classed him with those whose metaphysics has its roots in epistemology, and whose religion is an ethical and social postulate. Adam dwells almost exclusively on Plato's poetic symbolism, ignores the epistemological sources of his metaphysics, and altogether overlooks Plato's life-long combat against contemporary materialism and ethical nihilism. He has nothing to say of Plato's willingness to play providence to the vulgar, of his conviction that the principles of natural religion are indispensable to the social and moral order, of his readiness to make concessions to ethically harmless forms of popular superstition, provided only he can save what he deems the essential spiritual content of religion. Instead of tracing the history of Plato's metaphysical ideas and religious moods, he pieces together the symbolisms of the culminating poetic passages into an abstract system of theological metaphysics or metaphysical theology which he attributes to Plato. It is the usual method; but it merely puts a veil of words between the reader and Plato's real meanings.

In affirming God or gods, however vaguely and variously, Plato declares his belief in the necessity of preserving in some form the religious sanction of conduct, his abhorrence of superficial popular atheism, his faith in some higher spiritual meaning of the world. The idea of good, on the other hand, is the point in which certain definite lines of epistemological and ethical thought converge, and is unintelligible without them. The identification of God and the idea of good, however plausible so long as we merely equate phrases and compare symbols, is meaningless as soon as we look below the surface. And this conclusion is not affected by the fact that in supreme poetic and religious passages God is good and goodness is God, and that, if Plato believed in both as concrete entities, he could reduce his 'system' to unity only by identifying them. All such rigid and mechanical

reasoning proceeds upon the assumption that belief in a metaphysical postulate, and belief in God, and belief in the existence of the man in the next room, are on the same psychological plane. Plato believed in God because he was a Greek of conservative and religious feeling and abhorred the atheistic temper of the Sophistic 'enlightenment.' This was a far more intuitive and primary belief than his belief in the hypostatic reality of the idea of good. This latter he would always have affirmed, if challenged, because it was the inevitable outcome both of an epistemological theory that demanded the hypostasis of all general notions, and of a social doctrine that postulated in the rulers of mankind the conscious possession of a unity of purpose dependent on a consistent and completely reasoned ideal of good. To say, then, that because both are in our metaphysical terminology supreme transcendental entities, therefore the idea of good *is* God, is merely to cheat ourselves with words and substitute for the apprehension of Plato's meanings a juggling with his symbols.

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The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. By HANS DRIESCH.
London, A. and C. Black, 1908. — pp. xiii, 324.

This volume consists of the Gifford Lectures of 1907 ; but, since it is to be followed by a second volume containing the lectures of this last summer, it offers only an incomplete development of the author's position. For this reason, and because of disconnected presentation, of frequent repetition, and of hesitating argumentation, the volume is somewhat unsatisfactory. However, it contains much that is of value by way of summarizing recent work, and much that is suggestive by way of criticism.

Professor Driesch is certainly nothing if not persistent ; his position, as developed in a number of writings, was presented and discussed in this REVIEW two years ago,¹ and in these lectures the same main purpose is again found to be actuating him, namely, that of arguing for a vitalistic view of the organism and for the existence in it of an entity which is called "entelechy." Accordingly, so far as this general viewpoint is concerned, the criticisms of two years ago could only be repeated and again insisted upon as valid. Indeed in the present volume very little if any new evidence is presented ; possibly something more conclusive will be offered in the second volume, but this is hardly to be expected.

¹ "Driesch's Theory of Vitalism," by E. G. Spaulding, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XV, pp. 518 ff.